Qualia or No Qualia: Exploring Dennett’s Take on The Knowledge Argument

Have you ever experienced something so unique, so deeply personal, that it feels like an ineffable secret only you can truly understand?

This is what we refer to as “qualia”—the raw, subjective quality of experiences.

Imagine the deep red of a sunset or the taste of your favorite food; qualia are the colors of your mind’s inner landscape.

The philosopher Daniel Dennett challenged this concept, particularly within the context of the Knowledge Argument, and his objections are not easily dismissed.

The Knowledge Argument

Before we dive into Dennett’s critique, let’s first revisit the Knowledge Argument, one of the most famous thought experiments in the philosophy of mind.

It was put forward by Frank Jackson in the 1980s and centers around the character of Mary, a brilliant scientist who has spent her entire life in a black-and-white room, learning everything there is to know about the physical aspects of color.

Despite her extensive knowledge, when she first sees color for the first time—say, a red apple—she gains new, subjective knowledge, something she couldn’t have learned from her books.

The question that Jackson posed is simple: Does Mary learn something new when she experiences color for the first time?

If you’re like many who find this argument compelling, you’ll agree that the answer is “yes.”

Mary learns something entirely new—knowledge of what it is like to experience red, knowledge that cannot be captured by physical facts alone.

It suggests that there are aspects of our conscious experience—qualia—that transcend the purely physical world.

But what if Dennett is right?

What if, as he argues, qualia are an illusion, and Mary’s new knowledge is not so profound after all?

Breaking Down the Illusion

Dennett argues that the very concept of qualia is problematic.

In his essay “Quining Qualia,” he suggests that our understanding of qualia is rooted in mistaken intuitions about experience.

He asks: What are these “qualities” that we believe are intrinsic to our experiences, separate from their physical properties?

Dennett challenges us to see that qualia, as traditionally conceived, don’t seem to actually refer to anything at all.

To make his point, Dennett uses the term “quining,” which means to eliminate or “reject” something.

According to Dennett, the problem with qualia is that they are often described as intrinsic, non-physical properties of experience, but these descriptions fail to hold up under scrutiny.

In essence, he argues that qualia, as traditionally understood, don’t really exist.

They are a sort of cognitive mirage, a mental construct that we mistakenly think we experience in an isolated, pure form.

Jackson’s original argument relies on the assumption that Mary’s new knowledge demonstrates the existence of qualia.

If qualia do not exist in the way we commonly understand them, then Mary’s experience is not as revelatory as we think.

Dennett would argue that what Mary learns is not new knowledge at all, but rather a different way of interpreting the same physical data.

There is no “hidden” qualitative knowledge gained from experiencing red; what Mary gains is simply a new way to process the information she already possesses.

Consider Dennett’s idea that the subjective quality of an experience is nothing more than a byproduct of the brain’s processing of sensory input.

If the subjective experience of seeing red is entirely reducible to physical processes—neuronal firing, brain activity, and so on—then Mary’s “new” knowledge is not so much a revelation about a hidden quality of experience but a deeper understanding of the mechanisms at play.

In other words, Dennett would argue that we can fully explain Mary’s experience of seeing red through a combination of physical and cognitive processes, rendering qualia and their associated mysteries unnecessary.

Epiphenomenal Qualia: A Counterpoint

Of course, this view is not universally accepted, and many philosophers have offered counterarguments to Dennett’s position.

One of the most prominent alternatives is the notion of epiphenomenalism. This view holds that qualia are real but do not have any causal impact on the physical world.

In other words, our subjective experiences—though real—are like the froth on the surface of a boiling pot; they are byproducts of physical processes but don’t directly influence them.

An epiphenomenalist might argue that, even if Dennett is correct in rejecting the traditional conception of qualia, this doesn’t necessarily imply that the knowledge argument is refuted.

After all, even if qualia are epiphenomenal and have no causal power, they still exist in a real sense as part of the richness of human experience.

From this perspective, Mary’s new knowledge might be understood as her gaining access to a deeper layer of her consciousness, an understanding of the personal, subjective side of experience that no amount of objective knowledge could have prepared her for.

A Comparison of Perspectives

PerspectiveKnowledge of QualiaRole of QualiaImplications for the Knowledge Argument
Dennett’s ViewNo new knowledge; qualia are an illusionQualia are mental constructs with no referentThe Knowledge Argument fails, as new knowledge is just a reprocessing of physical facts
Epiphenomenal ViewNew knowledge, but qualia are causally inertQualia are real but do not affect behaviorThe Knowledge Argument holds, as qualia are real and provide new knowledge, though causally inert
Traditional ViewNew knowledge is gained about subjective experienceQualia are intrinsic properties of experienceThe Knowledge Argument holds, with qualia offering unique, non-physical eknowledge

Explaning The Concept Simply

I have to be honest – I am no a genius and sometimes I need to make simple simpler to understand phisophical concepts.

And the idea of qualia is no exception. Hence I prepared a very basic blueprint.

Imagine you’ve never eaten chocolate before. You’ve read all about it in books, learned it’s sweet, and even know how it’s made.

But when you finally take your first bite, something special happens—you don’t just know about chocolate anymore; you taste it.

That “wow” feeling of tasting chocolate for the first time is what some people call qualia.

It’s the personal experience of something that no amount of reading or studying could fully explain.

Now, there’s a story about a scientist named Mary. Imagine Mary lives in a black-and-white world, and she’s super smart.

She knows everything about how color works—how rainbows form, why the sky is blue, and all the science behind it.

But Mary has never actually seen color herself. Then one day, she steps outside and sees a red rose for the first time. People say Mary learns something new in that moment: what it’s like to see red.

That’s another example of qualia—experiencing something directly for the first time.

But here’s where things get tricky. Daniel Dennett says, “Wait a minute! Maybe there’s no such thing as qualia after all.”

He thinks that the idea of “special experiences” like tasting chocolate or seeing red is just our brain playing tricks on us.

Dennett believes we already know everything about those experiences from the facts we’ve learned—like knowing chocolate is sweet or red is a certain wavelength of light.

He argues there’s nothing mysterious or magical about the way these things feel; it’s just how our brains work.

To make sense of this, let’s use another example. Think about watching your favorite movie. It’s fun and exciting! But Dennett might say that if you understand how movies are made—like how cameras work, how actors perform, and how music sets the mood—you don’t really need anything more to “know” what it’s like to watch the movie.

Others, though, think Dennett is wrong. They’d say no amount of facts about making movies can capture the feeling of actually sitting down and watching one for yourself.

So the big question is: Is there something special about experiencing things, or can all experiences be explained by facts and science?

My Take

Despite Dennett’s compelling critique, I find myself resistant.

There’s something deeply human in the experience of qualia—something that feels undeniable.

Can we really dismiss this sense of inner richness as a mere illusion?

Is it possible that the knowledge I gain through my subjective experiences is somehow less meaningful than the knowledge I gain through logic and reason?

Perhaps the answer lies not in rejecting qualia, but in embracing their complexity. After all, the most profound truths in life often elude simple explanation.

Our understanding of consciousness may never be as tidy as Dennett would like it to be. But that doesn’t mean it’s not worth exploring.

Like the lyrics of a song that defy literal meaning but still stir our souls, qualia might be something that, though impossible to pin down with objective certainty, nonetheless defines the richness of our experience.

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